Using EMV cards for single sign-on by Pashalidis, Andreas & Mitchell, Chris J
Using EMV cards for Single Sign-On
Andreas Pashalidis and Chris J. Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London,
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom,
{A.Pashalidis, C.Mitchell}@rhul.ac.uk,
WWW home page: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk
Abstract. At present, network users have to manage a set of authenti-
cation credentials (usually a username/password pair) for every service
with which they are registered. Single Sign-On (SSO) has been proposed
as a solution to the usability, security and management implications of
this situation. Under SSO, users authenticate themselves only once to an
entity termed the ‘Authentication Service Provider’ (ASP) and are sub-
sequently logged into disparate network Service Providers (SPs) without
necessarily having to re-authenticate. The information about the user’s
authentication status is handled between the ASP and the desired SP
in a manner transparent to the user. In this paper we propose an SSO
scheme where user authentication is based on payment cards conform-
ing to the EMV industry standard. The card itself, in conjunction with
the EMV architecture, takes the role of the ASP. The associated SSO
protocol does not require online card issuer participation, preserves user
mobility and does not put user’s financial data at risk.
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1 Introduction
Network users typically have to manage a set of authentication credentials
(usually a username/password pair) for every Service Provider1 (SP) with
which they are registered. The number of such SPs with which a typical
user interacts has grown beyond the point at which most users can mem-
orise the required credentials. The most common solution is for users to
use the same password with every SP — a tradeoff between security and
usability in favour of the latter.
Single Sign-On (SSO) has been proposed as a solution to the usabil-
ity, security and management implications of this situation. It is a tech-
nique whereby users authenticate themselves only once to an entity called
1 In the context of this paper a service provider is any entity that provides some kind
of service or content to a user. Examples of SPs include messenger services, FTP
sites, web sites and streaming media providers.
2an Authentication Service Provider (ASP) and are logged into the SPs
they subsequently use, without necessarily having to re-authenticate. This
seamless experience increases the usability of the network as a whole but
introduces a number of security requirements. It is obvious that, under
SSO, SPs require some kind of notification from the ASP about the user’s
authentication status. These notifications are termed authentication as-
sertions. The SP, based on the authentication assertions provided by the
ASP, determines whether or not to grant access to a protected resource
to the specified user.
EMVCo2, an organisation formed by Mastercard3 and Visa4, has de-
veloped a set of Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) specifications for Payment
Systems [1–4] that focus on the card/terminal interactions that take place
at the Point of Sale between a cardholder and a merchant during a finan-
cial transaction.
In this paper we present a scheme in which EMV-compliant cards
provide user (i.e. cardholder) authentication, and propose an associated
protocol that facilitates SSO at disparate network SPs. In this scheme the
cardholder’s network access device itself, in conjunction with the card,
acts as the ASP. The scheme can be regarded as an alternative to other
smartcard-based authentication schemes, for example schemes that rely
on Subscriber Identity Module cards (used in cellular telephony). The
paper is organised as follows. The next section is a review of relevant
EMV architectural components and security services. Section 3 describes
the proposed authentication method and SSO protocol, while section 4
analyses the associated security threats. Section 5 discusses advantages
and disadvantages, and sections 6 and 7 give an overview of related work
and conclude the paper.
2 Review of EMV security services
This section introduces those components of the EMV specification that
are relevant to this paper. For a full description see [1–5].
In the EMV payment system there are four major interacting entities,
namely the cardholder, the merchant, an acquiring bank (the Acquirer)
and the card issuing bank (the Issuer). The specifications focus on the in-
teractions between card and merchant terminal. When the card is inserted




31. The terminal selects the appropriate EMV application by issuing a
SELECT command [1, p.65] to the card.
2. The terminal initiates ‘Application Processing’ by issuing a GET
PROCESSINGOPTIONS [3, p.19] and a number of READ RECORD [3,
p.23] commands. The purpose of this step is for the card and the ter-
minal to exchange the necessary data for the rest of the transaction.
3. The terminal performs ‘Processing Restrictions’ [3, p.48]. This manda-
tory step does not involve communication with the card — its sole
purpose is to provide assurance of application compatibility between
terminal and card.
4. The terminal issues an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE [3, p.21] com-
mand to the card. This optional step initiates ‘Oﬄine Data Authen-
tication’, which can be either Static Data Authentication [2, p.15] or
Dynamic Data Authentication [2, p.24]. The purpose of this step is to
verify the card’s authenticity.
5. The terminal performs ‘Cardholder Verification’ [3, p.50]. During this
optional step the cardholder’s Personal Identification Number (PIN)
is verified, either oﬄine to the card (using the VERIFY command [3,
p.25]), or online to the Issuer.
We next focus on the Dynamic Data Authentication (step 4) and
the Cardholder Verification (step 5) that are defined in the EMV speci-
fications. These steps are of particular interest since, in the authentica-
tion/SSO scheme proposed below, the card reader is under the control of
the cardholder.
2.1 Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA)
DDA is supported by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), as specified
in [2]. In particular, every DDA-capable card has its own asymmetric
key pair which is generated and loaded on the card by the Issuer. While
the private key cannot be extracted from the card, its public counterpart
can be retrieved with a READ RECORD command. This public key
is embedded in a public key certificate which is signed by the Issuer.
The Issuer’s public key certificate, signed by the Payment System’s top-
level Certification Authority (CA), is also stored in the card and can be
retrieved by the terminal. As a result, the merchant terminal only needs
to maintain an accurate copy of the CA’s trusted root public key in order
to verify the Issuer’s, and hence the card’s, public key certificates, and
finally any data signed by the card itself. CA public key management
principles and policies are defined in [2].
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given below:
1. The terminal retrieves the Issuer and card public key certificates from
the card. The latter is verified using the former and the former is
verified using the appropriate trusted root public key of the Payment
System’s top level CA.
2. The terminal issues an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to
the card. The command requires a number of parameters, including a
nonce.
3. The card computes a digital signature over the terminal-provided data
(including the nonce) and ‘card Dynamic Data’, which is data gen-
erated by and/or stored in the card [2, p.35]. The card outputs the
signature and the card Dynamic Data.
4. The terminal reconstructs the signed data structure and verifies the
signature using the card’s public key retrieved and verified in step 1.
DDA provides data integrity and freshness. Assuming tamper resis-
tance of the card and the soundness of the Issuer’s security procedures,
DDA also provides card authentication and card counterfeiting preven-
tion. It should be noted that not all EMV-compatible cards are DDA-
capable.
2.2 Cardholder verification
The identity of the cardholder is verified based on a PIN. The PIN is
entered into the terminal and may then either be verified online to the
Issuer or oﬄine to the card. In the latter case the terminal issues a VER-
IFY command to the card which takes the PIN as a parameter. It may
or may not be encrypted using the card’s public key. The card checks
whether the supplied PIN matches the one stored inside the card and re-
sponds accordingly. If the number of unsuccessful oﬄine PIN verification
attempts exceeds a certain limit, the PIN on the card is blocked and can
only be unblocked using a script sent to the card by the Issuer.
3 Using EMV cards for SSO
This section describes the proposed EMV-based SSO scheme.
53.1 System entities
The entities involved in the authentication/SSO scheme are the card-
holder system, the card itself, and the SPs.
As briefly mentioned above, the system requires the cardholder system
and the card to collectively act as the ASP. Instead of directly authenti-
cating to every SP, the cardholder is authenticated by the card, and the
card then vouches for the identity of the cardholder to every SP. The fact
that the CS would typically consist of a ‘standard’ PC, PDA or mobile
phone equipped only with a special SSO application and an EMV card
means that this offers an inherently mobile SSO solution; the SSO ap-
plication could be downloaded from a trusted source when required, and
the EMV card is inherently mobile.
The cardholder system The Cardholder System (CS) consists of the
user’s (i.e. the cardholder’s) network access device and a card reader.
A typical configuration would be a PC with an integrated card reader.
Whether or not the card reader is equipped with its own (trusted) keypad
is optional (see section 4.4). Alternatively, the CS could be a wireless
network access device (such as a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or a
3GPP5 mobile phone) capable of communicating with EMV cards. The
CS also needs some special software that implements the SSO protocol
described in section 3.3 below. This ‘SSO agent’ might be realised as
a process that continually runs on the CS (also known as ‘service’ or
‘dæmon’), or as part of the software that is used to access the SP (e.g.
the web browser, instant messenger, e-mail client, etc.). In this latter
context the SSO agent could be uploaded to the CS as an applet running
within the SP access software, e.g. as a Java applet running within the
web browser, or a Java MIDlet that is delivered over-the-air to a mobile
phone. The SSO agent is likely to be provided by an EMV card issuer or
a trusted third party.
The card The proposed EMV-based SSO scheme imposes certain re-
quirements on the cards, as follows. Cards must be DDA-capable. Unfor-
tunately, from the SSO perspective, the public key certificate used during
DDA binds the card’s public key to the cardholder’s Primary Account
Number [2, p.33]. It would constitute a potentially serious security and
privacy threat if the Primary Account Number was to be used in an
open environment such as the Internet. Therefore, the cards used in the
5 http://www.3gpp.org
6scheme described here need to possess a separate, dedicated EMV ap-
plication, which we call the card authentication application (AA). In the
AA, the Primary Account Number (and any other personally identifying
information) must be replaced with data that is not linked to the card-
holder’s identity (and cannot be used for financial transactions). This
implies that the Issuer has to provide the AA with an additional certifi-
cate for the card’s public key. It is required that this certificate does not
contain any personally identifying information for the cardholder; thus
we call it an ‘anonymous certificate’ in the sequel. As its serial number
can be used for user identification at SPs, it should not contain any other
information about the user (e.g. a name). Furthermore, the AA should be
able to maintain state within the current session. In particular, it should
be able to maintain a data element that indicates whether or not oﬄine
PIN verification (via the VERIFY command) has been performed dur-
ing the current session, and, if so, the data element should also indicate
whether or not PIN verification was successful. This card-provided PIN
Verification Data Element (PVDE) shall be included in the data that is
signed by the card during DDA, as part of the card Dynamic Data.
It should be noted here that a card session begins with Application
Selection (step 1 in section 2) and ends when the card reading device de-
activates the card [1, p.17]. This latter event includes premature removal
of the card from the reader.
Service providers In the proposed SSO scheme, SPs are required to
accurately obtain and store the root keys of the CAs of the EMV Pay-
ment Systems that are to be supported (and trusted). This requirement
is exactly the same as that applying to merchant terminals for ‘standard’
use of EMV cards. The management, distribution and revocation of these
root keys is outside of the scope of this paper, but the principles are simi-
lar to those specified in [2] for merchant terminals. It is assumed that SPs
require a user to be authenticated before granting access to protected re-
sources. Instead of executing an authentication protocol directly with the
user, SPs acquire the necessary authentication assertions from the CS, ac-
cording to the protocol described in section 3.3 below. Moreover, as users
also need to authenticate SPs, it is necessary that every SP possesses a
unique, human-readable identifier (SPID).
3.2 Trust relationships
The SSO scheme depends on the EMV cards offering a level of tamper-
resistance, since these cards act as a trusted computing module within
7the CS. In addition, cardholders need to trust that SPs will not collude
in order to compromise their privacy (see section 4.1). Cardholders and
SPs also need to trust that
– the Payment System’s top-level CA(s) will not impersonate cardhold-
ers,
– card Issuers will not impersonate cardholders.
From the cardholder perspective, authentication/SSO can be achieved
with those SPs that choose to trust the Payment System top-level CA cor-
responding to the cardholder’s card. From the SP perspective, authenti-
cation/SSO can be facilitated only for those cardholders whose Payment
System top level CA a given SP has chosen to trust. The architecture does
not provide for explicit trust management at the Issuer level. This feature
is inherited from the EMV PKI, which does not allow merchant terminals
not to trust individual Issuers that have been certified by a trusted CA.
This arises from the fact that EMV was designed for use within a closed
environment in which all parties (Issuers and Acquirers) have signed an
agreement with the brand. Indeed, even in the non-electronic world, mer-
chants are typically required to accept all cards bearing the brand as part
of the condition of being an approved merchant.
3.3 The SSO protocol
This section describes the protocol of the SSO scheme. The protocol starts
when the user requests a protected resource from the SP. As we see below,
the same protocol can also be used for initial user registration at an SP.
The protocol assumes that the SP has already been authenticated to
the user (cardholder) by some mechanism outside the scope of this pa-
per. Specifically, it is assumed that, as part of that mechanism, the user
manually verifies the SP’s unique identifier and, ideally, a cryptographi-
cally protected session is set up between the SP and the CS. A suitable
mechanism for SP authentication is, for example, an SSL/TLS channel
with server-side certificates6 [6]. In this case the SP’s unique identifier,
the SPID, would be a field in its SSL/TLS certificate (typically its unique
URL). Here it is worth noting that, if SSL/TLS is used for SP-to-user au-
thentication, our scheme essentially uses the commercial PKI established
on the Internet for SSL/TLS connections to facilitate SP-to-user authen-
tication, and the EMV PKI established for credit/debit card payments to
6 Since the user requests a protected resource, it is likely that an SSL/TLS connection
will be required anyway.
8facilitate user-to-SP authentication7. A detailed description of the SSO
protocol follows.
1. The SP sends an authentication request message to the CS. This
message contains a freshly generated nonce and an indication saying
whether or not PIN verification is required.
2. The CS selects the card’s AA, initiates application processing and
performs processing restrictions, as explained in steps 1-3 in section 2.
If this step fails, SSO also fails.
3. If PIN verification was required in step 1, the CS performs oﬄine PIN
verification with the card, as explained in section 2.2.
4. The CS performs DDA with the card. The main difference from the
‘standard’ DDA (as explained in section 2.1) is that the nonce used
with the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is the SP-provided
nonce from step 1. The SP’s Identifier (acquired during SP-user au-
thentication, as explained above) is also included in the data passed
to the card for signing. It should be noted that the CS cannot verify
the card’s and the Issuer’s public key certificates as it does not have
the root CA’s public key.
5. The CS sends an authentication assertion message back to the SP.
This message includes the following data structures obtained from
step 4.
– The card’s anonymous certificate.
– The card Issuer’s public key certificate.
– The card’s signature produced as part of DDA. This signature
covers the nonce of step 1, the SPID and the PVDE, as explained
in section 3.1.
– Any other data that is input to the card signature calculation.
6. The SP verifies the Issuer and card public key certificates, as explained
in section 2.1. The SP also makes sure that the card has not been
blacklisted and that the aforementioned certificates have not been
revoked. If this step fails, SSO also fails.
7. The SP reconstructs the data structure that was signed by the card
in step 5 and verifies the signature using the card’s public key. If
verification is unsuccessful, SSO fails.
8. The SP assesses the data used to compute the card’s signature. In
particular, the SP checks the SPID and makes sure that it indeed
7 From this perspective, the paper could be re-titled ‘Integrating EMV certificates
and SSL’. However, SP-to-user authentication schemes other than SSL could also
be used.
9represents this SP (and not any other). Furthermore, the SP assesses
the PVDE. If the SP’s requirements are met, SSO succeeds and access
to the protected resource is granted. Otherwise, SSO fails.
The CS’s response (step 5) does not contain any personally identifying
information about the cardholder. The SP may, however, differentiate
between users based on the unique (Serial Number, Issuer Identifier) pair
included in the card’s anonymous certificate. Furthermore, the protocol
can be used for initial registration of a user at a SP; the SP creates a new
user account for a newly encountered anonymous certificate.
The CS can achieve SSO at disparate SPs by running the protocol
whenever needed. Of course, the card needs to be in the card reader of
the CS during the protocol run. If PIN verification has been performed,
the card needs to remain in the reader between protocol runs so that the
session state is maintained within the card.
4 Threat Analysis
In this section threats to the scheme are evaluated.
4.1 SP collusion
If a number of SPs collude, they can trivially compromise user privacy by
correlating the unique identifying (Serial Number, Issuer Identifier) pairs
found in the card anonymous certificates. The scheme does not address
this threat.
However, as also pointed out in [7], complete prevention of a ‘SP
collusion’ attack is difficult as SPs may also be able to correlate users
based on other profile information they may maintain (such as names or
telephone numbers). As stated in the Liberty specifications [7, p.71], ‘The
only protection is for Principals [users] to be cautious when they choose
service providers and understand their privacy policies’.
4.2 Reflection attack
An attacker could forward the authentication request message (step 1 of
the protocol) received from an SP as part of the SSO process to a victim
user, while masquerading as the SP to that user (maybe by spoofing the
SP’s interface and SPID). Forwarding the user’s valid response (step 5)
to the SP might result in successful impersonation.
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This attack is prevented as long as the SP authentication method is
secure, it results in a cryptographically protected session and it is correctly
performed by the user. In the case of SSL/TLS this involves the user
inspecting the SP’s URL and making sure that it indeed represents the
desired SP.
As the CS’s authentication response contains the SP’s unique iden-
tifier, which is digitally signed by the card, intermediaries (such as an
attacker) cannot change it without being detected. At the same time the
SP is given assurance that the response is indeed meant for this particular
SP (and not any other).
It should be noted that the attack is not prevented if launched by a
dishonest SP. As explained in section 4.1, users should be cautious when
they choose SPs.
4.3 Traffic analysis
An attacker capable of monitoring network traffic between the CS and
SPs could compromise the user’s privacy in that the attacker will learn
which SPs the user is communicating with. The attack cannot be pre-
vented by encrypting traffic (using SSL/TLS, for example), as packet
headers typically need to be available in the clear for routing purposes.
This threat is outside the scope of the scheme described here, but could
be addressed separately using anonymising techniques, such as those de-
scribed by Chaum [8].
4.4 Attacks using a malicious Cardholder System
The EMV specifications make no provision for cards to authenticate mer-
chant terminals prior to releasing information. As a result, when the card
is inserted into the CS, it may be possible for malicious software in the
CS to extract private information (such as the cardholder’s Primary Ac-
count Number which is likely to be stored in the card) and to disclose it
to unintended parties. Similarly, if the card reader does not have its own
(trusted) PIN pad, the CS could collect cardholders’ AA PINs8. Further-
more, a malicious CS could spoof local and remote user interfaces and
abuse the user’s authentication status at SPs by modifying traffic or hi-
jacking the entire session, even if communications are ‘cryptographically
protected’. Thus, the SSO agent has to be trusted by the user not to
8 The PIN used by the AA should be separate from the PIN(s) used by EMV appli-
cations that may coexist on the card.
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engage in such behaviour and its integrity has to be protected. Having it
signed by a party trusted by the user (e.g. the card Issuer) might address
the threat, but risks remain if other malicious software is executed on the
CS.
However, despite these threats, the scheme provides two-factor user
authentication (proof-of-possession of the card and, if required, proof-of-
knowledge of the PIN), even in the presence of a malicious CS: firstly, it
requires the EMV card to be present in the CS; without it user authenti-
cation (and therefore illegitimate impersonation) will fail. Secondly, the
scheme protects against the CS falsely pretending that PIN verification
took place; the PIN verification status maintenance is managed by the
trusted card itself, as explained in section 3.1. This protects against PIN
compromise by a malicious CS as the PIN never needs to be inserted into
the device (for SPs that do not require PIN verification).
4.5 Stolen EMV card
Stolen EMV cards allow attackers to impersonate users to SPs that do
not require PIN verification. The obvious countermeasure is for SPs to
require PIN verification. In this case the attacker will not be able to
impersonate the legitimate cardholder, even by using a maliciously mod-
ified CS. Of course, if the attacker also has access to the user’s PIN, then
impersonation will be successful.
In order to guard against ‘stolen card’ attacks, SPs should follow the
same procedures as merchant terminals. In particular they should pe-
riodically contact card Issuers and/or Payment System CAs to obtain
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and/or blacklisted card information.
Step 6 in of the SSO protocol (section 3.3) provides for checking of these
CRLs and blacklisted card information.
4.6 Service denial attacks
The scheme requires the SPs to check whether the signature returned by
the CS is computed using the correct nonce, i.e. it requires the SP to main-
tain state while waiting for the response from the CS. This potentially
opens the door to service denial attacks. However, we have assumed prior
SP-to-user authentication, which ideally results in a secure session. This
means that, before the SSO protocol is executed, the SP has established
that it is talking to an existing client for whom it has already created
some state. The fact that the SP is required to remember a nonce for
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each user-to-SP authentication attempt, is thus not likely to significantly
increase the SP’s exposure to service denial attacks.
4.7 Signature oracle attacks
The SSO scheme, as described in sections 3.1 and 3.3 (step 5), involves
the card signing a data string containing a nonce supplied by the SP.
Thus the protocol involves the card signing a message, part of which is
provided by an external party. There exists the possibility that this could
be used as part of an ‘oracle attack’, where the card is persuaded to sign a
string that could be used in another application using the same key pair.
The reason why this is not a significant threat in the case of the EMV
payment application is that the signed string is different in format from
the one expected by an EMV application.
5 Advantages and Disadvantages
This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the described
SSO scheme.
5.1 Advantages
Advantages of the authentication/SSO scheme described in this paper
include the following.
– The scheme reuses the existing EMV PKI which is already established
on a world wide basis.
– The scheme does not require a continuous online presence of the card
Issuer.
– Once the authentication/SSO protocol has completed successfully,
subsequent protocol runs do not necessarily require user intervention.
This yields transparent user authentication at subsequently used SPs.
– As user authentication may be transparent, the protocol can be re-
peated whenever appropriate. An online banking SP, for example,
may wish to ensure that the cardholder’s card is still present in the
CS whenever access to a sensitive resource is requested. Rerunning the
SSO protocol during a session increases the achieved level of security
without usability implications.
– No identifying information about the user is included in the messages
exchanged. This protects the user’s anonymity and privacy. Further-
more, no risks of personal information exposure arise at the SP.
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– Maliciously acting devices can only compromise the user’s current
session or impersonate users while the EMV card is present. Further-
more, they cannot falsely pretend that PIN verification took place
successfully.
– The scheme does not necessarily require an online third party. SPs
need, however, to follow the same principles and policies as merchant
terminals with respect to the certificates used.
– The scheme preserves user mobility.
– The scheme can potentially be adapted as a new Liberty Alliance [7]
profile.
5.2 Disadvantages
Disadvantages of the authentication/SSO scheme described in this paper
include the following.
– Issuers must install a separate EMV application on the card in order
to support user authentication. This is a potentially significant cost.
This cost is minimised if the AA is installed on the card at the time of
issue, and it has to be weighed against the potential benefits gained
by the Issuer. These might include new revenue streams from SPs that
benefit from the AA.
– The cards used must be DDA-capable. The cost of DDA-capable cards
is higher than the cost of cards not capable of DDA.
– It obviously works only for EMV cardholders equipped with card read-
ers. The cost of the card reader (and maintaining the SSO agent), has
to be weighed against the convenience offered by SSO.
6 Related Work
Single sign-on architectures within enterprise environments are examined
in [9]. Currently deployed or proposed SSO schemes for open environ-
ments are based on a continually online ASP [10–12]. The scheme pro-
posed in this paper, on the other hand, does not necessarily require the
continuous online presence of any party; it falls into the category of local
true SSO schemes [13]. Being based on a different trust model, it also
constitutes an interesting alternative to the aforementioned schemes.
Other related work includes [14], where a security-enhanced e-commerce
transaction scheme based on EMV cards is proposed. The scheme makes
use of DDA and oﬄine PIN verification in order to facilitate card and
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cardholder authentication respectively. Being a payment scheme, how-
ever, it requires online presence of the Issuer and does not aim for user
privacy protection.
An annex of [3] describes how to combine the Secure Electronic Trans-
action (SET) protocol9 with EMV-compliant cards for electronic transac-
tions conducted over the Internet. The complexity of the scheme is quite
high. In addition, it requires the online presence of a ‘Payment Gateway’
which is connected to the Acquirer’s (and Issuer’s) legacy network.
Finally, it is worth noting that Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
cards of mobile phones have recently been augmented with EMV-compliant
applications (http://www.oberthurcs.com) and that mobile equipment
with EMV-compliant card readers has been available for some time.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a SSO scheme which relies on EMV-
compliant cards for cardholder authentication at SPs. These cards need
to be able to perform asymmetric cryptographic functions (i.e. DDA)
and must have a separate EMV ‘Authentication Application’ installed on
them by Issuers.
The CS itself acts as ASP for relying SPs. The scheme does not require
online participation of the Issuer and its security does not depend on CS
integrity, as core functions are delegated to the trusted card. It leverages
the existing and established EMV PKI and preserves user mobility and
privacy, and can be regarded as an alternative to other smartcard-based
user authentication mechanisms (such as Subscriber Identity Modules).
The associated SSO protocol only requires minimal interaction, yield-
ing a potentially seamless user experience and allowing several transpar-
ent re-authentications to occur within a given user/SP session.
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